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Abstract—Managing information security in the cloud is a
challenge. Traditional checklist approaches to standards com-
pliance may well provide compliance, but do not guarantee to
provide security assurance. The complexity of cloud relationships
must be acknowledged and explicitly managed by recognising
the implications of self-interest of each party involved. We begin
development of a conceptual modelling framework for cloud
security assurance that can be used as a starting point for
effective continuous security assurance, together with a high level
of compliance.
I. INTRODUCTION
An important aspect of developing an assurance model
for security in the cloud is that it be compliant with best
practice in the development and maintenance of information
security management systems, (e.g., [1]–[3]). Companies are
now subject to a raft of legislative and regulatory requirements
and compliance with standards can provide a useful way of
ensuring these requirements are met. The corporate business
environment is constantly evolving with greater emphasis be-
ing placed on responsibility and accountability [4], especially
for the security and privacy of data [5].
A number of security standards have recently evolved, but
the very number raises the issue of which one to comply
with. Should it be ARTS, CSA, CSCC, DMTF, ENISA, ETSI,
FedRamp, GAPP, GICTF, ISO, ITU, NIST, OASIS, OCC,
OGF, OMG, PCI or SNIA ([2], [6]–[9]), to name but a
few? For example, the international ISO 27000 information
security management system standard [3] is itself broken down
into a considerable number of individual standards. There are
currently 21 published standards, 14 at draft stage (around
2 years from being published) and over 7 in study period
(around 4 years from being published). The pace of evolution
of new technology far outstrips the capability of international
standards organizations to keep up with the changes [10].
The business environment is also constantly changing,
as are corporate governance rules, with more emphasis now
being placed on responsibility and accountability [11], social
conscience [12], sustainability ([13], [14]), resilience [15] and
ethics [16]. These changes are pushing the traditional prin-
ciples of corporate governance ([17], [18]) based on agency
theory to their limits. Increasing technology complexity height-
ens exposure to risk, particularly if the potential concomitant
problems are not understood or addressed [19]. Thus, there is
a need for a more agile and effective approach to address these
issues. With the cross disciplinary nature of today’s corporate
world there is more cross-over between disciplines than in the
past, which means no single discipline can effectively deal
with all the issues arising from the use of cloud technology
[20].
In this paper, we propose a conceptual framework for
cloud security assurance, expanding on earlier works ([21],
[22]), which seeks to address these issues and provide a more
effective means for business to achieve both cloud security
assurance along with appropriate standards compliance. We
draw on natural resource management research ([15], [23])
which provides some very clear illustrations of the effective-
ness of stewardship, presenting a clear systems view of the
issues addressed. The remainder of the paper is organized as
follows: in Section II we explain the fundamental concepts of
information security, exploring the issues faced in more detail,
and how these can form a barrier to successful implementation
of cloud security assurance; in Section III we look at possible
approaches to address these issues; in Section IV we explain
our conceptual framework; in Section V we discuss our
conclusions.
II. THE ISSUES TO BE ADDRESSED
The fundamental concepts of information security are
confidentiality, integrity, and availability (CIA). Beautement
and Pym [21] provide an account of the misunderstandings
prevalent in information security which arise through con-
fusion between (declarative) objectives of ([24], [25]) infor-
mation security operations with the (operational) mechanisms
deployed in order to achieve these objectives. For example,
to achieve a declarative objective of confidentiality, access
control provides the operational mechanism to achieve this.
To achieve a declarative objective of availability, hardware
redundancy can be deployed as an operational mechanism to
achieve this objective. Conceptually, it is important to separate
the treatment of each in order to understand how objectives
might be delivered. Bearing this in mind, we will concentrate
on the three issues outlined in the introduction: the standards
issue, the agency issue, and the complexity issue.
A. The Standards Issue
There is a growing trend for large corporates in the UK
to move towards ISO 27000 compliance. In 2012, PwC [26]
note that almost two thirds of the UK’s largest companies
are either fully or partially ISO 27000 compliant, thus we
shall concentrate on these standards in this paper. As already
stated, the pace of evolution of new technology far outstrips
the capability of international standards organizations to keep
up with the changes [10], as is particularly evident with the
International Standards Organization (ISO). The ISO 27000
[3] series of standards on Information security management
systems are not yet fully developed, with over 21 still yet to
be published.
Standards such as 27017 cloud computing, 27018 per-
sonally identifiable information, 27033 parts 4-6 network
security, 27034 part 2-6 application security, 27036 supplier
relationships, 27038 digital redaction, 27039 intrusion detec-
tion systems, 27040 storage security, 27041-3 digital evidence
and 27044 security information and event management, are
drafts, implying possibly two years from becoming a published
standard. Areas such as electronic discovery, co-ordination
of investigative projects, personal information management,
taxonomy, ICT supply chain security, 27009 cloud security
technology and 27011-19 sector specific implementation, are
still in a study period, meaning possibly four years before
publication. The principal limitation of these standards is that,
by the ISO’s own admission, they represent a statement of what
to do in order to be compliant, not how to do it. That is left
to the individual organization or business. Further, there is a
tendency for those engaged in audit compliance work to adhere
to checklists, rather than executing due diligence with regard
to information security and risk management [27]. Finally, the
multiplicity of cloud standards under development throughout
the world, with little co-ordination between them, adds to the
difficulty.
B. The Agency Issue
The principles of corporate governance ([17], [18]) based
on agency theory struggle to adequately handle the rising
complexity of organizational relationships and sustainability
caused by the increasing reliance on cloud systems. The root
of this problem can be traced back to the modern corporation,
as discussed by Berle and Means [28], creating a separation
between ownership and control of wealth. While owners would
generally prefer to manage and control their own companies
to maximize their own utility, the large scale of the modern
corporation puts their massive capital needs and economic
obligations far beyond the reach of the individual.
Jensen and Meckling [29] recognized that while both
principal (shareholders) and agent (managers) were utility
maximizers, they would not necessarily always have the same
alignment of goals. Further, the agent is more likely to
have complete knowledge, whereas the principal’s generally
is incomplete. This can disadvantage the principal, or at least
require the expenditure of additional sums to try to safeguard
their position. Over time agents, having more complete infor-
mation, can make more decisions which do not fully benefit
the principals, resulting in better utility for themselves. It is
very rare that the goals of principal and agent will perfectly
align, thus maximising mutual satisfaction, and this is the
fundamental flaw which agency theory highlights.
C. The Complexity Issue
Cloud computing opens up exposure to new issues. While
cloud economics are highly attractive, providing a great driver
to use cloud, there are significant issues of security and privacy
to consider. There is also an increase in the complexity of
systems, the potential number of actors and exposure to new
risks [30]. Due to the global structure of many cloud service
providers, there are also issues of the sovereignty of data.
Where previously everything was stored and operated from
within the domain of the organization, with cloud computing
this can be enormously more complex and can therefore
expose the business to additional unexpected risk. Whether an
organization uses the cloud alone for all their business needs,
or integrates cloud use into their own, possibly extensively
distributed, IT systems - it is clear that ensuring proper security
of information is likely to be a non-trivial exercise.
At the most basic level, a simple two-dimensional security
matrix can be used. Additional layers of classification or clear-
ance can easily be accommodated. Here, data classification is
listed along the top, and the clearance required to access that
data is listed along the side. For example, someone with low
clearance can access all unclassified data, but are not able to
access classified data. However, in a typical large organization
utilising an IT system comprising distributed resources and
services running over various locations this becomes more
complex. Particularly where standards compliance is required,
such a system would require mapping onto a three dimensional
matrix, such as demonstrated in Figure 1 in order to achieve
a declarative view for compliance purposes. This is necessary
to reflect the increase in potential relationships between the
business architecture, the systems architecture and the security
requirements.
Fig. 1. A Declarative Three-dimensional Security Matrix
This figure can outline the basic declarative position needed
for compliance. It demonstrates three interconnected layers:
first, there is the security properties layer, which comprises the
traditional CIA security properties; next, there is the systems
architecture layer, which comprises the system, the services
and the applications used; finally, there is the business archi-
tecture layer, which comprises people, process and technology
(the hardware used for the IT systems). This three-dimensional
matrix helps demonstrate the relationships between each of
the layers — there are twenty seven potential relationships to
consider. These relationships characterize the business policy
required to ensure compliance. Thus, the intersection of X1,
Y1 and Z1 represents how confidentiality, system and people
should be addressed. However, the lack of relevance of the
standards, many of which were defined before cloud computing
was developed, presents a problem. Indeed, the very mech-
anisms which make cloud computing economically attractive
are at the same time increasing the difficulty and complexity of
security issues, which may have a knock on impact on the cost
benefits. Yet, finding a means of assessing the impact of cloud
computing on standards compliance should prove attractive for
those businesses wishing to benefit from implementing cloud
computing.
III. POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS TO THESE ISSUES
A. Standards
We must first understand that ISO standards do not yet
exist at any sufficient level of detail to enable proper security
in cloud computing. Second, any business which has achieved
standards compliance on information security management
systems, must be under no illusion that they have a secure
system. The approach used to achieve compliance under the
standards as they currently exist can lead to a false sense of
security, which in turn can lead to potential disaster. This
can result in putting the business, shareholders, managers,
customers, suppliers, government and audit firms at heightened
risk of exposure to knock on attacks or other losses or liabilities
following unexpected compromise of systems. Third, we can
recognize that to achieve the comfort of a good level of secu-
rity, we need to appreciate the true level of the complexities
involved and deal with them appropriately.
B. Agency
The implications of agency theory, agents adhering to
the terms of their contract without necessarily achieving the
principal’s desired outcomes, are problematic and the literature
has considered the more principle-based stewardship approach.
This has been discussed over several decades across a number
of disciplines, such as accounting ([31], [32]), management
research ([33]–[35]), information stewardship ([36], [37]),
where Pym et al specifically focus on cloud stewardship,
and in natural resource management [15], where Chapin et
al demonstrate, using a systems view, the benefits of the
stewardship approach, as does Kao [23].
Since the utility of the steward (managers) is in alignment
with the utility of the principal (shareholders), this removes
the temptation to make decisions solely for the benefit of
the steward. Any decision that benefits the principal will also
benefit the steward. The stakeholders and relationships in a
business are not, of course, limited to managers and share-
holders. Customers, suppliers, government, audit firms and
even the local communities are stakeholders in the business.
As noted above, in corporate governance today we see much
more consideration being given to the notion of corporate
social responsibility, resilience, sustainability and an ethical
approach to doing business. There is certainly more pressure
on managers in today’s business world to take a more outward
view of their actions, potentially leading to a more responsible
stewardship approach. This is accompanied by an ever growing
appetite for more accountability in business, being driven both
by shareholders, government, customers, suppliers, auditors
and the general public.
C. Complexity
A distributed system is by its very nature highly complex,
and we must recognize that this is inevitable. Indeed, using
cloud increases the complexity further, and we must recognize
that, too. We have seen from Figure 1 how we can prepare a
simple declarative model of the relationships to be considered
in order to ensure the security of a business. We then need
to expand this model to allow us to address the importance
of today’s corporate governance culture, by adding sustain-
ability, resilience and ethicality to the traditional CIA security
requirements. We then add IaaS, PaaS and SaaS to cover using
the cloud, where each of these services may be provided by
different service providers, although this can be reduced where
these are serviced by a single supplier. We show in Figure 2
how this expanded model would look.
Fig. 2. A Declarative Cloud Three-Dimensional Security Matrix
This increases the number of potential relationships from
our original twenty seven, to one hundred and eight, depending
upon the number of extra layers needed, but serves well to
illustrate the size of the problem. Consideration will also
have to be given to the detailed technical composition of the
architecture deployed, as it may be necessary to consider far
more than the 108 relationships shown here. Providing policy
is extended to accommodate these additional relationships, we
can see that the declarative position can clearly reflect the
additional complexities generated by incorporating cloud use.
D. Why the Time is Right for Change
The culmination of years of self-serving behaviour on the
part of managers has led to more extreme agent behaviour [39].
It also leads to a short term view of running a business, and this
can work against the long term sustainability of the business
and impact adversely on resilience. It can also lead to driving
managers into behaving less ethically due to these pressures
to perform in the short term. Equally, the agency behaviour of
large scale shareholders has helped to encourage this behaviour
in managers, as these shareholders are frequently looking for
the best short term returns. Thus, the effects of greed by both
managers and certain shareholders seem to take agency theory
to a logical extreme. There is no mechanism in agency theory
to deal with the broad themes of sustainability, resilience
and ethicality. This can be highlighted by some well-known
examples. Enron and other scandals led to the passing of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act [38] in the US. In 2008, the banking
crisis occurred, with all the attendant fall out. There have been
countless corporate frauds of some magnitude, such as the
Madoff scandal. There is a perception among shareholders that
the prescriptions to deal with agency theory no longer work
to reign in the worst excesses of corporate management [39].
There is a natural synergy between stewardship and cloud
ecosystems [22]. Cloud ecosystems are dependent on the
building and maintaining of robust relationships between all
the actors in the ecosystems [40]. This dependency arises
out of a need for sustainability, resilience and ethicality. In
order for a greater take up of cloud usage, there needs to
be trust and a mutual accountability between all the actors
involved. The multiplicity of actor relationships and this need
for responsibility and accountability means that the traditional
agency approach cannot succeed. The cloud ecosystem is
too rich an environment for the agency approach to function
efficiently, whereas stewardship can easily handle this level
of complexity [41]. The European Commission recognizes the
existence of this complexity in relationships, especially with
regard to information security in the cloud, and has produced
a working paper [44] for discussion on the subject. The ISO
27000 standards, while they address the notion of security, are
not yet sufficiently well developed to fully cover these issues.
We believe a stewardship approach, defining relationships by
principles rather than rules, represents an ideal mechanism to
address the shortcomings which presently exist. This approach
may provide a useful means to help businesses adopt cloud
more readily, to better reap the benefits and economies offered,
while maintaining a better grasp of the security implications
associated with such a move.
IV. THE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR CLOUD
SECURITY ASSURANCE
As discussed in Section II there is a clear need to separate
declarative and operational layers. We believe it is necessary
to add two further layers in order to ensure the effectiveness
of the model in operation and to meet corporate governance
requirements. We propose to add an assurance layer, which will
monitor how effectively the operational layer meets the goals
set in the declarative layer; and an audit layer to confirm the
whole system is functioning properly and achieving the stated
goals.
The process will be iterative in nature. The results achieved
by the operational, assurance and audit layers continually
provide feedback to the declarative layer which will be used
to improve the efficiency of the operation of all layers. We
envisage security will involve every employee in the business,
customers and supply chain. All have a part to play in
the success of ensuring the security of the business. It will
be necessary to adapt the model to suit the sector-specific
requirements of each business, whether physical, operational,
regulatory or otherwise. We can thus divide the assurance
model into four main layers: the declarative layer; the op-
erational layer; the assurance layer; and the audit layer. The
example high-level declarative model we illustrate in Figure 3
provides an overview of how the layers fit together.
A. The Declarative Layer
It is necessary for management to define very clearly what
their security and stewardship position is in respect of each
of the intersecting points described in the three-dimensional
matrix (see Figure 2), although some will be dictated by
statutory or regulatory obligations. We borrow from economic
utility theory, for example [43], to introduce a simple economic
utility model into these relationships to provide a weighting to
reflect the security preferences or requirements of the business,
allowing us to develop a simple means of tailoring the model
to fit each individual business.
In representing the policy of the organization, there are
three main aims for each of the relationships defined in the
declarative model: to provide a mechanism for measurement,
to define a target position, and to incorporate a utility pref-
erence over the target. By way of an example, if we look
at co-ordinate (X3, Y 3, Z2), this represents “availability for
applications to run processes”. For each such component of the
declarative model, as specified in Figure 2, that is of interest
— let’s assume we index these components by a variable i —
we associate a component Ui of a utility function, as follows:
• Measure: Mi; for example, % uptime of systems hard-
ware; in this case, expressed as an average over time;
• Target: mi, the declarative target for this operation;
• A function fi expressing how utility depends on devi-
ation from target. For example, a Linex function [42],
usually expressed in the form g(z) = (exp(αz) − αz −
1)/α2, is used to capture a degree of asymmetry that is
parametrized by α;
• The weight wi (between 0 and 1, and
∑
i wi = 1)
expressing the managers’ weighting/preference for the ith
security component of interest;
• This can be expressed thus: Ui = wifi(Mi −mi);
• System equation Mi = si(xi), where xi is a vector of
control variables and si describes Mi’s dependency upon
them.
Thus the overall utility function is
U =
∑
i
Ui =
∑
i
wifi(Mi −mi).
By introducing suitable stochastic processes into the system
functions si, we can obtain a treatment of the expected utility
of the system. In general, such a treatment of a system’s
properties will be too complex to have analytic solutions
for the control variables, so that simulations must be used.
By evaluating each co-ordinate in the declarative layer, the
business can define their position on the security risks they
face and the resulting utility model of the whole will reflect
the level of utility they seek, while ensuring compliance with
any standards. It will also be possible to place constraints on
the targets. For example, in the above example, the target
may be 99.99%, but the constraint may be that availability
should never fall below 98%. In analysing all the co-ordinates
of this model, it may be that some threats are subsidiary to
others, and that by securing the main threat, this eliminates the
subsidiary threats, although this may not always be the case.
Each business or organization can take a view on whether they
cover them individually, or as related groups, as appropriate
to suit their particular needs.
B. The Operational Layer
The second layer is the operational layer, which is used
to reflect the current status of all existing business processes.
In Figure 3, we can now see the relationship between the
declarative and the operational layers. The declarative layer
provides the goal for the operational layer to reach and
provides the tools needed to ensure these goals can be met.
We need to make the assumption that performance data will be
available for measurement of the effectiveness of these tools.
By way of an example, in the context of ensuring the confi-
dentiality of personal data of clients, if we look at co-ordinate
(X1, Y 2, Z1) in Figure 2, this represents “confidentiality of
services for people”. The following tools and status might then
apply: use card access to terminal (to limit physical access to
the system); use authentication procedure (to ensure the user
is who they claim to be); apply access controls (to ensure
the system only allows access to the correct data by users
authorized to access that data). However, we need to recognize
that performance data will not always be available, in which
case it will be necessary to develop suitable heuristics. This
data needs to be available to cover each of the relationships
in the system, some of which will come from data logging of
system events, and it may be useful to use analysis tools to
automatically analyse the data and summarize it for ease of
interpretation.
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Fig. 3. The Declarative/Operational/Assurance/Audit Layers (see Subsection
IV(E) for notes
C. The Assurance Layer
The assurance layer provides the assurance that the sys-
tem’s implementation is delivering the specified goals. It
represents a declarative assertion, at a far more detailed level
than the declarative layer provides, of what is needed to ensure
these goals are met. Figure 3 shows how this layer fits with
the declarative and operational layers of the system. Searching
questions will need to be asked in order to ascertain how well
the assurance layer is helping the operational layer meet these
declarative requirements. The idea is to ask difficult questions
in order to root out potential weaknesses which might other-
wise go unnoticed. This will be an ongoing iterative process,
continually searching to uncover weaknesses, and constantly
striving to ensure the security goals of confidentiality, integrity,
availability, sustainability, resilience and ethicality are met.
D. The Audit Layer
The audit layer provides the operational means to check
how well the operational processes are performing. Figure 3
shows how the audit layer fits into the overall relationship
between the other layers. The running of the audit layer will
be an iterative process, continually searching to uncover weak-
nesses, and constantly striving to ensure security objectives are
maintained.
This function will be carried out at two levels, internally
by the internal audit department of the business, and exter-
nally by the auditors responsible for certifying compliance
with standards. Internal audit will require strong backing
from management to ensure it is empowered to perform at
the requisite level of effectiveness and this process will be
ongoing, providing constant feedback. The external auditors
should review the effectiveness of the assurance layer, and
should seek to search out weaknesses using long established
auditing techniques such as are used in financial reporting.
They will need to address each of the relationships of the
system to ensure all potential risks are properly identified and
properly addressed, not by way of checklists, but rather by
exercising due diligence with regard to information security
and risk management. This process is likely to be far less
frequent than the work carried out by internal audit.
E. How the Layers Interact
Management specify their security and stewardship pref-
erences in the declarative layer, which are passed to the
operational layer at (1) in Figure 3. The operational layer
provides the necessary tools for implementation, providing the
necessary performance data/heuristics. There will be feedback
to management at (2). The assurance layer provides the de-
tailed declarative assertions for the system which are fed to
the audit layer at (3). The audit layer provides the necessary
operational processes to check how effective assurance is, and
feeds back to the assurance layer at (4). As we see from (5),
the responsibilities for this process are shared internally, by
internal audit who will provide input for design/operational
improvement, and externally, by the external auditors who will
provide the external validation/compliance. These interactions
will be highly iterative, responding to the ever changing
threats faced by the organization, some of which are shown in
Figure 3, with a permanent cycle of information flows back and
forth across the layers. The whole process will more effectively
inform compliance with whichever standards the business may
choose.
V. CONCLUSION
By extending the use of declarative and operational sys-
tems modelling to include an assurance and audit layer for
businesses using cloud ecosystems, we can create a suitable
framework to improve the effectiveness of cloud security
assurance. This framework could provide a more effective
continuous monitoring system than is achieved using existing
standards compliance mechanisms. The frequency with which
these standards are reviewed is insufficient for proper security
assurance. Also, the systems involved are far too rich in com-
plexity to be able to be properly assessed and any meaningful
assurance given by means of a checklist.
It is vitally important to differentiate between the declar-
ative and operational layers of an assurance model, but this
alone is not enough to be truly effective in assuring an adequate
level of security. It is certainly true that defining management
security and stewardship policy at the declarative level, and
matching these requirements with the operational tools needed
to achieve these targets, represents a great improvement on
traditional methods of assurance. However, continuous mon-
itoring using the assurance layer tightens the effectiveness
of the system substantially. Adding the audit layer — which
can now be approached in a more cost effective fashion over
time — really serves to produce an assurance model that can
actually provide the comfort of an effective level of security.
This framework can be mapped onto the requirements of
whichever standards are chosen by the business.
A factor common to most of the evolving cloud security
standards is the reliance on checklists to establish a “snap-
shot” view of compliance, on an infrequent temporal basis.
This checklist culture can shift the focus away from facing
uncomfortable truths in favour of achieving compliance at all
costs. The threat environment we live with today continues
to evolve, with criminals finding ever more inventive ways
to attack. They are relentless in their pursuit, and businesses
must become ever more vigilant in order to safeguard their
electronic assets. It is time to deploy effective tools in this
fight to defend their assets.
REFERENCES
[1] H. M. Gov, “Best Practice Cyber Security and Information Assurance,”
2013. [Online]. Available: https://www.gov.uk/government/policy-teams/
office-of-cyber-security-and-information-assurance
[2] ENISA, “ENISA Best Practice,” 2013. [Online]. Available: http://www.
enisa.europa.eu/
[3] ISO.org, “ISO/IEC 27000:2009-Information technology-Security tech-
niques -Information security management systems - Overview and vo-
cabulary,” ISO.org, Geneva, Switzerland, Tech. Rep., 2009.
[4] S. Pearson, “Toward Accountability in the Cloud,” IEEE Int Comp, 2011.
[5] M. Mowbray & S. Pearson, “A Client-Based Privacy Manager for Cloud
Computing,” Proc 4th Int ICST Conf on COMSWARE ’09, 2009.
[6] Cloud Standards Org, “Cloud Standards,” 2013. [Online]. Available: http:
//cloud-standards.org/
[7] Cloud Security Alliance, “Cloud Standards,” 2013. [Online]. Available:
https://cloudsecurityalliance.org/
[8] FedRamp, “FedRamp Cloud Security Standards,” 2013. [Online]. Avail-
able: http://www.fedramp.gov/
[9] PCI, “PCI Security Standards,” 2013. [Online]. Available: https://www.
pcisecuritystandards.org/
[10] G. T. Willingmyre, “Standards at the Crossroads,” StndView, 1997.
[11] M. Huse, “Accountability and Creating Accountability: a Framework
for Exploring Behavioural Perspectives of Corporate Governance,” Brit
J. Mgt, 2005.
[12] A. Gill, “Corporate Governance as Social Responsibility : A Research
Agenda,” Berkeley J. Int’l L., 26, 2, 2008.
[13] C. Ioannidis, D. Pym & J. Williams, “Sustainability in information
stewardship: Time Preferences, Externalities and Social Co-Ordination,”
in WEIS 2013, 2013, to be published.
[14] A. Kolk, “Sustainability, Accountability and Corporate Governance:
Exploring Multinationals’ Reporting Practices,” Business Strategy and
the Environment, 17, 1, 2008.
[15] F. Stuart Chapin, G. P. Kofinas & C. Folke, Principles of Ecosys-
tem Stewardship: Resilience-Based Natural Resource Management in a
Changing World. Springer, 2009.
[16] S. Arjoon, “Corporate Governance: An Ethical Perspective,” J. Bus
Ethics, 61, 4, 2005.
[17] S. Ross, “The Economic Theory of Agency: The Principal’s Problem,”
The Amer Econ Rev, 63, 2, 1973.
[18] M. Eisenhardt, “Agency Theory : An Assessment and Review,” Acad
Mgt Rev, 14, 1, 1989.
[19] E. Zio, “Reliability engineering: Old problems and new challenges,”
Reliab Eng & Sys Safety, 94, 2, 2009.
[20] M. Dlamini, J. Eloff & M. Eloff, “Information security: The moving
target,” Comp & Sec, 28, 3-4, 2009.
[21] A. Beautement & D. Pym, “Structured systems economics for security
management,” in WEIS, 2010.
[22] A. Baldwin, D. Pym, M. Sadler & S. Shiu, “Information Stewardship
in Cloud Ecosystems: Towards Models, Economics, and Delivery,” 2011
IEEE Third Int Conf Cloud Comp Tech and Sci, 2011.
[23] R. Kao, Stewardship Based Economics. World Scientific, 2007.
[24] D. B. Parker, Fighting Computer Crime: A New Framework for Pro-
tecting Information, S. Bosworth, Ed. Wiley, 1998.
[25] P. G. Neumann, “Comp-Related Risks. 1995,” Addison-Wesley, 1995.
[26] PwC on behalf of BIS and Infosecurity Europe, “UK
Information security breaches survey 2012,” 2012. [Online].
Available: http://www.pwc.co.uk/en UK/uk/assets/pdf/olpapp/
uk-information-security-breaches-survey-technical-report.pdf/
[27] House of Lords Select Committee on Economic Affairs,
“Big 4 Audit Firms Enquiry,” 2013. [Online]. Available: http:
//www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-a-z/lords-select/
economic-affairs-committee/news/big-4-auditors-inquiry-report/
[28] A. A. Berle & G. C. Means, The Modern Corporation and Private
Property, 1932.
[29] M. C. Jensen & W. H. Meckling, “Theory of the Firm: Managerial
Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure,” J. of Fin Econ, 1976.
[30] W. Jansen & T. Grance, “Guidelines on Security and Privacy in Public
Cloud Computing,” NIST, Tech. Rep., 2011.
[31] F. Gjesdal, “Accounting for Stewardship,” J. Acc Res, 19, 1, 1981.
[32] V. O’Connell, “Reflections on Stewardship Reporting,” Acc Hor, 2007.
[33] L. Donaldson, “Stewardship Theory or Agency Theory: CEO Gover-
nance and Shareholder Returns,” Aus J. Mgt, 16, 1991.
[34] J. H. Davis, F. D. Schoorman & L. Donaldson, “Toward a Stewardship
Theory of Management,” Academy of Management Review, 22, 1, 1997.
[35] C. E. Crutchley & R. S. Hansen, “A Test of the Agency Theory of
Managerial Ownership, Corporate Leverage, and Corporate Dividends,”
Fin Mgt, 18, 4, 1989.
[36] P. S. Licker, “Application Stewardship: A User Responsibility Approach
to Post-Implementation Application Performance,” MIS Quarterly, 2010.
[37] D. Pym, M. Sadler, S. Shiu & M. C. Mont, “Information Stewardship
in the Cloud : A Model-based Approach,” Proc of the CloudComp, 2011.
[38] SOX, “Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,” p. 66, 2002.
[39] J. Harris, “Whats Wrong with Executive Compensation?,” J. Bus Eth,
85, 1, 2009.
[40] D. Pym, M. Sadler, S. Shiu & M. C. Mont, “Information Stewardship
in Cloud Computing,” Int J. Serv Sci, Mgt, Eng, and Tech, 1, 1, 2010.
[41] C. Ioannidis, D. Pym & J. Williams, “Fixed Costs, Investment Rigidi-
ties, and Risk Aversion in Information Security : A Utility-theoretic
Approach,” 2013.
[42] A. Zellner, “Bayesian estimation and prediction using asymmetric loss
functions,” 1986.
[43] R. Keeney & H. Raiffa, Decisions with Multiple Objectives: Preferences
and Value Trade-Offs. Wiley/Cambridge University Press, 1993.
[44] European Commission, “Unleashing the Potential of Cloud Computing
in Europe,” 2012.
